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The Second Time as Tragedy: The Assisted 
Suicide Cases and the Heritage of Roe v. Wade 
By SETIIF. KREIMER• 
I. Introduction: The Abortion Controversy and the Fate of 
Substantive Due Process 
For the last quarter century, Roe v. Wade1 has provided a landmark for 
constitutional analysis. Those who envisioned judicial review primarily as 
a backstop to majoritarian politics began with the proposition that Roe, like 
Lochner v. New YorK before it, was insupportable as constitutional doc-
trine, and rejected a role for the Court in enforcing unenumerated constitu-
tional rights. Those who viewed the Court as an appropriate standard 
bearer for extra-textual normative aspirations often admitted the weakness 
of Roe's stated rationales, but nonetheless began with Roe as a touchstone 
and reasoned toward other righ~. 
A decade ago, the opponents of Roe seemed poised to triumph in the 
Supreme Court, but Planned Parenthood v. Case]~ appeared to turn the 
tide.4 Amidst a harshly divided series of opinions, a decisive plurality of 
the Court reaffirmed the vitality of Roe, if only as a matter of stare decisis, 
and endorsed, on its merits, the role of judicial review in the protection of 
unenumerated rights.5 The plurality opinion buttressed the somewhat in-
choate claims of "privacy'' that underlay Roe with a constellation of ration-
ales that built on rights to bodily autonomy, spiritual integrity, and gender 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Copyright October 1997. 
This essay has benefitted from the comments of my coileague, Matt Adler, as weii as the infoma-
tion and insights I have obtained as a participant in the Greenwalt Seminar on Social Sciences in 
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania. Any mistakes, misapprehensions or missteps are, of 
course, my own responsibility. 
1. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
2. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
3. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
4. A similar and parallel watershed arguably occurred in the political arena two years ear-
lier with the rejection of Judge Robert Bock's nomination to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bruce 
A. Ackeman, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process: Transformative Appoint-
ments, 101 HAR.v. L. REV. 1164 (1988). 
5. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-53. 
[863] 
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equality.6 At the same time, the Casey dissenters attacked the plurality's 
project as an avatar of a judicial role rejected with the fall of Lochner in the 
constitutional reconstruction that attended the New Deal? 
In the intervening five years, the Court has been willing, if not eager, 
to take constitutional issue with the outcome of the democratic process in a 
series of cases, 8 but it has not invoked substantive due process in those con-
frontations.9 Consequently, until last Term's assisted suicide cases, the 
Court has had no occasion to elaborate on the rationales for protecting re-
productive autonomy, or how those rationales fit with the broader enter-
prise of protecting unenumerated rights. On both sides of the aisle, the ac-
cusation of reviving the substantive due process of Lochner has remained 
an epithet of choice; indeed the Casey dissenters tended to deny the legiti-
macy of the entire enterprise of substantive due process analysis.10 
This Term's assisted suicide cases bade fair to reopen the debate. The 
Court faced two separate circuits whose various opinions adopted at least 
four separate doctrinal approaches on a contested issue of public morality, 
6. See id. at 856. 
7. I d. at 998. 
8. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 {1996); United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 
2264 (1996); Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 
(1997); Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush 
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Adarand Constructors Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
9. The Court has rejected substantive due process challenges this Term outside the assisted 
suicide arena in Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct. 1865, 1867 (1997); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 
S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997); and Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169, 1172 (1997). Earlier post-
Casey claims have been no more successful. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994); 
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); Concrete Pipe of Cal. v. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 
U.S. 602 (1993); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
The Court sustained a challenge to a punitive damages verdict in BMW of North America, 
Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604 (1996Hhough it is not at all settled that a challenge to a jury 
verdict is quite the same as a challenge to the decisions of political branches. 
10. For liberals accusing conservatives ofrevivingLachner, see Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1176 
n.60 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (Souter, J., dissenting); Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard, 512 U.S. 374, 406 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1907 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (accusing majority of relying on a "speculative substantive due process right"). 
For conservatives accusing liberals of misusing substantive due process, and questioning the 
legitimacy of the doctrine, see. for example, TXO v. Alliance Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Carlton, 512 U.S. at 39. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("If! thought that 'sub-
stantive due process' were a constitutional right rather than an oxymoron ••• • ");Albright, 510 
U.S. at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 125 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) ("so-called 'substantive due process"'); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) 
(Rehnquist, J.) ("more generalized notion of 'substantive due process"'); BMW, 116 S. Ct at 1611 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Substantive due process right'' is an ''unjustified incursion into the prov-
ince of state governments."). But cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 58 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (acknowledging "due process" right against prison physician's deliberate indifference). 
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as well as an orchestrated array of amicus briefs the like of which it had not 
encountered since Casey.11 One might have expected that the specter of 
two circuits simultaneously wielding Casey to invalidate long-standing 
prohibitions of the criminal law would provoke the Casey dissenters again 
to attack the legitimacy of extra-textual judicial review. On the other hand, 
the rationales of bodily autonomy and spiritual integrity which had been 
sketched in Casey tended to support the decisions of the Second and Ninth 
Circuits that terminally ill patients should have a right to assistance in 
ending their lives. In determining whether or no~ as I put it in an earlier 
commentary, one could be pro-choice but anti-Kevorkian,12 the heirs of the 
Casey plurality could have been expected to solidify and clarify the basis of 
their decision. 
In fac~ neither outcome came to pass. The Court was unanimous in 
accepting Roe and Casey-and with them substantive due process analy-
sis-as part of the contemporary constitutional canon.13 Moreover, every 
opinion accepted a substantive extra-textual right to "bodily integrity" tha~ 
until now, had seemed only tenuously grounded. At the same time, the 
Court was unanimous in voting to reject the Second and Ninth Circuit's 
opinions and remitting the basic issue of assisted suicide to the state and 
federal political processes.14 
The Court's unanimity on these issues, however, was voiced in no less 
than six separate opinions.15 What remains unclear, therefore, is exactly 
how the Court accomplished these potentially contradictory results, or what 
the combination means for either the future of assisted suicide or of con-
stitutional law. This article explores these questions. 
· Washington v. Glucksberfi6 marks the end of a generation of discord 
over the legitimacy of substantive due process. Nonetheless, I suggest that 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion cannot sustain its claim that an "es-
tablished method" of substantive due process analysis, rooted in history and 
tradition, explains both the abortion cases and Glucksberg.11 I argue that 
although Justice Souter's call for "arbitrariness review'' based in the com-
11. The LEXIS online computer service lists 62 briefs lodged with the Court in Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), and 61 in Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). By way 
of comparison, it lists 37 briefs in Casey. 
12. See Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey 
and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803 (1995). 
13. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-53. 
14. See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at2230-32; Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2274. 
15. I leave to one side the majority opinion in Quill which depends on the basic proposition 
in Glucksberg that the prohibition of assisted suicide is not to be regarded with any heightened 
judicial skepticism. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2264-65. 
16. I 17 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). 
17. /d. at2260. 
866 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:863 
mon law can account for the outcome in Glucksberg, 18 it lacks constitu-
tional mooring. By contrast, I maintain that the focus on physical suffering, 
informing the concurrences of Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg, is 
both constitutionally supportable and morally informative. Finally, I ad-
vance the proposition that whatever their individual failings, the opinions 
in Glucksberg, taken as a whole, do a signal service to the nation. In my 
view, the Court has redeemed the promise of Roe by respectfully consider-
ing a tragic conflict and providing frameworks {or further moral argument 
by the rest of society. 
II. Substantive Due Process, the Body, and the Constitutional 
Canon 
The unanimity of the Justices in Glucksberg powerfully illustrates the 
current status of substantive due process. For Justices O'Connor and 
Souter, who joined the prevailing plurality opinion in Casey, and Justice 
Stevens, who concurred separately, there is nothing new in the proposition 
that "substantive due process" review is a legitimate judicial enterprise, and 
that it encompasses the abortion right. In their separate opinions in the as-
sisted suicide cases, each of these Justices assumes that in implementing 
the commands of the Due Process Clause, the Court has authority to invali-
date legislation that is sufficiently at odds with our societj's moral aspira-
tions.19 
Justice Breyer, who joined the court after the Casey decision, wrote an 
opinion accepting the legitimacy of the enterprise of identifying "arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints" as well as "interests" that "require 
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgement."20 Justice Ginsburg, who is likewise new to the official de-
bate, filed a cryptic concurrence in the judgment. aligning herself with the 
views of Justice O'Connor.21 Neither of these positions is much of a sur-
prise. 
18. Id. at2258. 
19. See id. at 2277 (Souter, J., concurring}; id. at 2306·07 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice 
O'Connor's position is a bit more opaque. In light ofherprior concurrence in Crozan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health, 491 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (arguing that there is a fundamental 
right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment), it is clear that she sees a role for substantive due 
process in defense of bodily autonomy, but her concurrence in Glucksberg goes no further than 
"assuming" the recognition in an interest in avoiding tenninal suffering, on the way to refusing to 
address it, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 {9'Connor, J., concurring}. 
20. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 {1961) 
{Harlan, J., dissenting)}. 
21. See id. at 2310. It is unclear exactly what methodology Justice Ginsburg believes is ap· 
propriate. Justice Ginsburg has tartly criticized the use of a ''vague concept of substantive due 
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It is Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Glucksberg that provides 
the novelty. Although Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist each dis-
sented in Casey, they join the proposition that "[i]n a long line of cases, we 
have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of 
Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause in-
cludes the rights . . . to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abor-
tion."22 Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion that contained this 
language; Justices Thomas and Scalia joined the majority opinion without 
reservation.23 Unlike the Casey dissents, which contested the legitimacy of 
judicial involvement in the entire enterprise of enforcing unenumerated 
rights, the majority opinion in Glucksberg makes it unanimous among sit-
ting Justices that the courts may intervene on behalf of unenumerated rights 
in general and reproductive autonomy in particular.24 At least for the near 
future, the Supreme Court has reached an equilibrium in which the right to 
choose an abortion is accepted as a constitutionally protected interest on a 
par with the constellation of family, marriage, and contraception. 
The majority opinions in the assisted suicide cases reaffirm, as well, 
the right to bodily integrity as a maxim of constitutional analysis. In 
Glucksberg the majority includes "bodily integrity" in its litany of consti-
process, a 'rais.ed eyebrow test' as its ultimate guide." BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 
1589, 1617 (1996) (citation omitted). She has suggested elsewhere that Roe would have been 
better resolved on equal protection grounds. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in A Judicial 
Voice, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1199-1200 (1992). 
22. I 17 S. Ct. at 2267 (citations omitted). See id. at 2262 ("We begin, as we do in all due-
process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices.") (citing Casey, 
505 U.S. at 849-50). Justice Rehnquist's opinion was even able to muster an approving citation to 
Roe itself as supporting the proposition that the Court has protected "personal activi-
ties ••• identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our con-
cept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 
/d. at 2271. Moreover, the Glucksberg majority cited the joint plurality opinion in Casey as "the 
Court's opinion" which concluded ''the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and 
once again reaffirmed." !d. at 2270 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846). 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (I994}, had earlier cited 
Casey as according substantive due process protection in ''matters relating to marriage, family, 
procreation, and the right to bodily integrity," but it did not mention abortion. Justice Scalia's 
special concurrence in Albright reiterated his opposition to substantive due process analysis out-
side of incorporation. Id. at275-76 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Another indication of the state of affairs is the per curiam opinion in Mazurek v. Armstrong, 
117 S. Ct. 1865, 1868 (1997), which rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the merits, but nonetheless 
cited Roe as setting the basic standard in the area of abortion. 
23. See 117 S. Ct. at2260. 
24. Likewise, the per curiam decisions this Term, rejecting particular challenges to state 
statutes which interfere with the opportunities to obtain abortions, still accepted the legitimate role 
of the courts in judging whether interferences rose to a magnitude that imperilled conceded con-
stitutional rights. See Mazurek, I 17 S. Ct. 1865 (rejecting challenge to statute requiring abortions 
to be performed only by licensed physicians); Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169 (1997) (re-
jecting challenge to parental notification requirement for abortions sought by minors). 
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tutionally protected interests?5 This recognition provides a clear and wel-
come announcement of the constitutional stature of the physical rights of 
the citizens' persons against government intrusion-an affirmation that was 
not part of the rationale in Roe v. Wade. It was, after all, less than a quarter 
century ago that the Court intimated a strong general constitutional protec-
tion against bodily abuse by governmental officials,26 and several members 
of the Court have in the interim suggested a limitation of substantive due 
process rights to those rights which have textual analogues in the Bill of 
Rights.27 As late as last year, a circuit panel en bane held that a right to 
avoid sexual assault by governmental officials was not sufficiently well-
grounded to form the predicate for criminal prosecution?8 Glucksberg and 
Quill, combined with the comments this Term in United States v. Lanier,29 
put an end to any doubts that the federal courts can legitimately invoke the 
norms of substantive due process to protect citizens against physical abuse 
by the government in all venues. 
The assisted suicide opinions reaffirmed, as well, the proposition that 
patients have a constitutionally protected right to refuse life sustaining 
25. 117 S. Ct at 2267. In Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct 2293 (1997), the Court reads Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), as based in a "well established, 
traditional right to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching." 117 S. Ct at 2301, 
(citing Cruzan, 491 U.S. at 278-79). 
26. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-74 (1977). Ingraham rejected a claim that 
brutal paddling of students constituted cruel and unusual punishment, but classified the right to 
avoid physical assault as a "liberty interest" In the same term, the Supreme Court for the first 
time accepted a prisoner's claim that the imposition of physical suffering by prison guards was 
constitutionally barred. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
27. See, e.g., Allbright, 510 U.S. at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring); id at 273. (plurality opinion 
of Rehnquist, J.) ("Where a particular Amendment provides explicit textual source of constitu-
tional protection ••• that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due proc-
ess• must be the guide," (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395)); cf. Graham, 490 U.S. 395 ("[A]II 
claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force ••• should be analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment ••• rather than under a substantive due process standard"). 
Justice Scalia, despite his scorn for "substantive due process" in most areas, has at least once 
accepted the proposition that a prison physician who causes physical harm by deliberate indiffer-
ence violates "the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against the deprivation of liberty without 
due process." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 58 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
28. See United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane), rev'd, 117 S. 
Ct 1219 (1997). 
29. Lanier, 117 S.Ct at 1228 n.7 ("Graham v. Connor does not hold that all constitutional 
claims relating to physically abusive government conduct must arise under either the Fourth or 
Eighth Amendments ••• [rather than] the rubric of substantive due process." (citation omitted)). 
As I have suggested elsewhere, the efforts to constrain physical abuse by government offi-
cials constitutes both one of the most prominent and one of the most eminently justifiable roles 
that judicial review plays in our current constitutional equilibrium. See Seth F. Kreimer, Explor-
ing the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY 
BILLOFRTS. J. 427 (1997). 
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treatment.30 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court had assumed arguendo that a 
right to bodily integrity protected competent patients against being treated 
against their will.31 This proposition could have been regarded as dictum. 
In Glucksberg, the right to refuse life sustaining treatment has advanced to 
the status of a maxim of constitutional law. This is no revolution, since the 
right to refuse such treatment is recognized in most states as a matter of lo-
cal positive law,32 but, again, it demonstrates how far the courts have come 
in two decades. 
This unanimity of approval for protecting abortion as an unenumer-
ated right and the reaffinnation of a more general right of bodily autonomy, 
however, mask a decided lack of consensus on other issues. The Justices 
disagreed on the analytical basis for the right to bodily autonomy and were 
far from clear as to how their reasoning meshes with the unanimous rejec-
tion of the plaintiffs' claims. 
ill. The Majority's ''Established Method": Constitutional Law 
as Tradition 
In writing the Court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist an-
nounced an intention to follow an "established method of substantive due 
process analysi.s."33 This alone is striking rhetoric, implicitly acknowledg-
ing a legitimate tradition of extra-textual judicial review in which· the 
method is "established." By claiming to identify an "established method" 
of review, the majority opinion reaches further: it purports to enunciate a 
mode of analysis which both characterizes and justifies the outcomes that 
make up this tradition. 
In the majority's "established method,n determining whether an as-
serted right can be characterized as "fundamental" plays a central role. Ac-
cording to the majority, "special protection" which invokes something be-
yond a demand for rational justification presupposes a ''threshold" 
determination that the challenged state action implicates a "fundamental 
right."34 This, in turn, involves two types of showings: that the claim in 
question is "objectively deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion"35 and that it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that 
30. Only Justice Stevens could be read as suggesting that the right to refuse treatment is 
protected only for the tenninally ill. See G/ucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2306 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
31. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't ofHealth, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990). 
32. See 1 ALAN MEisEL, THERIGHrTO Dm 16-17, 38-41,50 (2d ed. 1995). 
33. 117 S. Ct. at 2268 & n.17 ("established approach"). 
34. /d. at 2268. 
35. !d. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
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"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."36 Accord-
ing to the majority, in the absence of such showings, the claim in question 
can demand only that the government act in a fashion that is rationally re-
lated to legitimate government interests.37 
The claim for assisted suicide fails at this threshold. From the propo-
sition that "a consistent and almost universal tradition ... has long rejected 
the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today,"38 follows the 
conclusion that the right did not achieve the status necessary to trigger in-
trusive judicial scrutiny. Thus the opinion merely recites a variety of state 
interests, from the "symbolic and aspirational" interest in the preservation 
of human life, to a concern for avoiding suicide by those who are depressed 
or otherwise vulnerable, to concerns regarding the ''time-honored" line in 
medical ethics between healing and harming.39 Each is sufficiently rational 
to sustain the statute, without investigating their relative strengths. 
In sum, according to the majority, absent legislative irrationality, 
courts may intervene only to protect those "fundamental rights found to be 
deeply rooted in our legal tradition.',.~0 At one level, this seems quite 
straightforward. According to the majority, courts are not empowered to 
roam the fields of public policy measuring the acts of government against 
their own free-floating sense of morality.41 Rather, the "guideposts" for 
exercising intrusive judicial review are to be found in the ''Nation's history, 
legal traditions, and practices."42 The Court seeks to preserve an~ient liber-
36. 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)). Later, 
the Court characterizes the relevant activities as those "so deeply rooted in our histocy and tradi-
tions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment." /d. at 2271 (emphasis added). 
37. See id. at 2268. The majority also emphasizes that ''we have required ••• a 'careful de-
scription' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." /d. It is hard to Imow exactly what to 
make of this requirement; few lawyers would suggest utilizing sloppy or haphazard descriptions 
oflegal concepts. 
Two bracketing observations are possible. First, the "requirement'' is not the same as the 
"most specific level" requirement suggested by Justice Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.). A citation to Michael H. is conspicuous in its absence. 
Second, there is some suggestion that courts should avoid abstraction. The majority rejects the 
claim that what is at issue is "a right to die." It distinguishes Cruzan as an opinion involving a 
right to "refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition" or "medical treatment," and maintains that the 
question involved in these cases is whether the Due Process Clause protects a "right to commit 
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so." 117 S.Ct. at 2269-70. Elsewhere, 
the right is referred to as a liberty interest in "ending one's life with a physician's assistance." /d. 
38. /d. at2269. 
39. /d. at2274. 
40. /d. at 2268. 
41. In this, the majority purports to differ dramatically from Justice Souter's concurrence, 
which it accuses of requiring "complex balancing of competing interests in evecy case." /d. Jus-
tice Souter denies this. See infra text accompanying notes 82-87. 
42. 117 S. Ct. at2268. 
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ties; it guards against the rare innovations or aberrations that threaten long-
standing and deeply rooted values of our society. 
The majority's approach explains some of the cases in the substantive 
due process canon. In Pierce v. Society of Sisteri3 and Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 44 state legislatures adopted novel regulatory regimes which inter-
fered with traditional parental prerogatives in child-rearing. In Rochin v. 
Califomia,45 low-level officials sought to assault the bodily integrity of a 
suspect in a fashion repugnant to the common decency imbedded in na-
tional traditions of appropriate law enforcement. At another level, how-
ever, Justice Rehnquist's opinion is deeply mysterious, for in seeking to ar-
ticulate an "established method" of substantive due process analysis, the 
majority's approach conspicuously fails to explain another set of cases 
which it acknowledges to be part of the canon of substantive due process.46 
The majority's "settled approach" has difficulty accounting for cases 
like Eisenstadt v. Baird 41 or Loving v. Virginia.48 Worse, what the major-
ity refers to as the "established method" cannot encompass the cases which 
are most crucially relevant to assisted suicide: Cruzan and Roe itself. 
43. 268 u.s. 510, 530-32 (1925). 
44. 262 u.s. 390, 397-99 (1923). 
45. 342 u.s. 165, 172-74 (1952). 
46. The approach is also in some tension with cases decided by members of the Glucksberg 
majority under other constitutional provisions where the Court overturns legislation which accords 
with settled practices, by invoking extra-textual values as has been its wont in recent years. See, 
e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (invoking right to electoral districting process in which 
race does not "predominate"); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (announcing 
right to color blind decision-making by federal government under substantive "equal protection 
component'' of Due Process Clause); or unwritten "principles" of governmental structure which 
have only tangential support in the practices of the constitutional framers. See also Printz v. 
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Seminole Tribev. Florida, 116 S.Ct.114 (1996). 
47. 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (protecting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried cou-
ples). 
In the precursor to Eisenstadt, Justice Harlan maintained in Poe v. Ullman that the criminali-
zation of the use of contraceptives by married couples was unprecedented in world history. 367 
U.S. 497, 554-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He also noted, however, that on the underlying 
question of whether the state could coercively inhibit the distribution and sale of contraceptives 
and otherwise inhibit their use, ''not too long ago the current of opinion" embodied in governing 
statute, was entiiely hostile to contraception. Jd. at 546 n.12. Moreover, Eisenstadt involved the 
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried rather than married couples. 405 U.S. at 443. 
48. 388 U.S. I, 11-12 (1967) (protecting interracial marriages). The definition of who can 
engage in marriage, of course, has been traditionally subject to state control, from age limitations 
to the definition of incest to the legal monopoly on divorce. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 
190,211-12 {1888) (noting that the state may define rights, duties and obligations of married cou-
ples). Miscegenation laws like those Loving overturned go back to the founding of the republic. 
See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882) (upholding harsher punishment of inter-racial 
sexual activities); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 412-15 (1857) (faney, C.J.) (giving ac-
count of colonial and early American prohibitions on marriage by members of different races). 
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The majority characterizes the "right assumed in Cruzan" of "refusing 
unwanted [lifesaving] medical treatment'' as the fruit of a "long legal tradi-
tion protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment.'"'9 The 
earliest exemplar of the ''tradition" of refusing medical treatment that the 
Court identified in Cruzan, however, was a case from the late 19th century 
which rejected, on procedural grounds, the effort to compel medical exami-
nation of a tort plaintiff.50 While tort law has long viewed unconsented 
touchings in general as technical batteries, once a patient submitted to 
medical ministrations, the legal scope of patient autonomy was far from 
clear during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the common law de-
velopment of informed consent doctrine has been largely an artifact of the 
second half of the twentieth century.51 As Justice Scalia pointed out in his 
concurrence in Cruzan, there is a common law history both of mandating 
life-saving medical treatment and physically interfering with efforts to end 
one's life.52 Moreover, the ''tradition" in question is strictly a matter of 
49. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct at 2270. 
SO. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), cited in Cruzan,. 497 U.S. 261, 
269 (1990). The Court's Cruzan opinion referred as well to cases from the 1980s indicating that 
"the common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a 
competent individual to refuse medical treatment," 497 U.S. at 277. It cited Schloendoiffv. Soci-
ety of N.Y. Hasp., 211 N.Y. 125 (1914), a case which did not involve life-saving treatment, and 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), which in fact allowed compulsory vaccination. 
497 u.s. at 278. 
51. See MartinS. Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History 
of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3 PREsiDENT'S COMMISSION FOR STUDY OF 
EnncAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1982); JAY KATZ, 1HE 
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); RUTH R. FADEN, Ef AL., A HisTORY AND 
1HEORY OF INFoRMED CONSENT 79 (1986) (providing account of 19th century doctor taking re-
sponsibility for decision not to amputate patient's leg without informing patient); id. at 74 (argu-
ing that rudimentary consent-seeking in surgery during the 18th and 19th century was not based in 
respect for patient's autonomy, but on "practical and clinical necessity."); id. at 117 (observing 
that 18th century courts recognized tort only if medical experts testified that seeking consent was 
an "ordinary and beneficial part of medical therapy."); id. at 123-25 (describing controversy about 
scope of consent requirement). 
52. Cruzan, 491 U.S. at 297-98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing John F. Kennedy Mem'l 
Hosp. v. Heston. 58 N.J. 516 (1971)); Application of President & Dirs. of Georgetown College, 
Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Indeed, if the common law right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment was as well established as the Glucksberg majority makes it out to be, it is hard to 
fathom why the doctors in Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976}-which the Court in Quill characterized 
as ''the first state-court decision explicitly to authorize withdrawing lifesaving treatment," 117 S. 
Ct at 229~uld claim that their "existing medical standards" precluded withdrawal of the res-
pirator. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 666 (holCling that refusal to order withdrawal of respirator was 
proper ''under the law as it then stood"). 
Justice Stevens' concurrence highlights ·the fact that the evolution toward the right to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment has been an evolution away from the common-law equilibrium. 117 S. 
Ct at 2306 (''We have recognized, however, that this common-law right to refuse treatment is 
neither absolute nor always sufficiently weighty to overcome valid countervailing state inter-
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common law. As the same Justices who comprised the Glucksberg major-
ity were at pains to point out in another case this Tenn, society's interest in 
avoiding danger "to self or others" has traditionally justified a legislature in 
overriding protected interests in avoiding medical treatment. 53 
Recently, a substantial social and legal consensus has developed that 
allows competent patients a virtually untrammeled right to refuse life-
saving medical treatments.54 But this consensus emerged in the last two 
decades; it is hardly a subsisting tradition from the legal regime of the 
Founding or Reconstruction, when medical treatment was itself a far 
chancier and less efficacious enterprise. If this counts as a "deeply rooted 
tradition," roots grow quickly indeed, and the justification for judicial in-
tervention must be phrased in tenns of an evolving social consensus rather 
than an aspiration to retain traditional liberties. This is not necessarily a 
bad thing, but it is not what the majority purports to be doing when it keys 
analysis to ''traditional Iiberties."55 
The gap between the methodology articulated by the majority as a 
means of identifying "fundamental" liberties and the constellation of liber-
ties it accepts as fundamental, moreover, grows to a yawning chasm when 
the Glucksberg majority confronts Roe and Casey. The burden of the cur-
rent doctrine on abortion, as the majority articulates it, is ''that a woman 
has a right, before her fetus is viable, to an abortion 'without undue inter-
ference from the state."'56 Yet, as Justice Rehnquist stressed in his dissents 
in Casey and Roe, that right did not reflect the legal tradition of the 
Founding or Reconstruction. At common law, abortion after quickening 
was thought to be a crime; by the time of the framing of the Fourteenth 
ests • • • • In most cases, ••• the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment will give way to the 
State's interest in preserving hwnan life."). 
53. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2074 (1997) (upholding confmement that was 
arguably necessary to treat mental abnormality and to protect the public from sexual predators 
(citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26 (approving mandatory vaccination))). Cf. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 
252-53 (recognizing that right of bodily autonomy may be overridden in proceedings of public 
import including divorce and criminal proceedings). 
54. See 1 ALANMEISEL, THERIGIITTODIE37-77 (2ded.1995). 
55. At some points, the majority opinion flirts with the notion of an evolving consensus. In 
setting the scene for its legal discussion, Justice Rehnquist lays out not only the common law his-
tory of the prohibitions of suicide but the contemporary political debate, 117 S. Ct. at 2265-67, 
and concludes that after "serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide ••• we 
have not retreated from this prohibition." /d. at 2267. (By ''we," Chief Justice Rehnquist pre-
swnably does not mean the Supreme Court, but the people of the United States). 
So, too, the majority's introductory discussion highlights "history, tradition and practice." 
!d. (emphasis added). A bit later, the majority describes "our Nation's history, legal traditions, 
and practice~' as the "crucial guideposts" in substantive due process decision-making. !d. at 
2268 (emphasis added) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); see also 
117 S. Ct. at 2268 n.l7. What is not clear is whether current practice can merely negate an oth-
erwise "rooted" historical tradition, or whether it can germinate roots itself. 
56. 117 S. Ct. at2270 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 50S U.S. 833,846 (1992)). 
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Amendment, abortion at any stage of pregnancy had been legislatively pro-
hibited in 28 ofthe 37 states, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, 
every state prohibited abortion.57 It is, as Justice Rehnquist has quite 
rightly noted for a quarter century, difficult to say that a "deeply rooted tra-
dition of relatively unrestricted abortion in our history supported the classi-
fication of the right to abortion as 'fundamental."'58 Indeed, unlike the 
emerging trend toward a state-level right to refuse treatment at the time of 
Cruzan,59 free availability of abortion at the time of Roe was distinctly a 
minority position,60 so that the Court's intervention could not even be justi-
fied as protecting an evolving consensus ''tradition" of recent vintage. 
At the core of the Glucksberg majority's opinion, therefore, is an un-
resolved contradiction. On one hand, the majority purports to accept abor-
tion as part of the legitimate landscape of substantive due process, and to 
explain that landscape on the basis of an "established method." On the 
other hand, the historical test which the Court uses as a way of avoiding the 
normative argument that assisted suicide is a "fundamental right" works 
equally well to block the most important parts of the doctrine which the 
Court claims to accept. 
It is possible, of course, that in the "established method," history sim-
ply has a veto, rather than a determinative vote. The majority's analysis 
begins with the question ''whether this asserted right has any place in our 
Nation's traditions,"61 and, fmding a "consistent [continuing] and almost 
universal tradition" of rejection, it concludes that the right cannot be con-
51. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting, joined by White, Scalia, and 
Thomas, JJ.); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174-75 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
58. Casey, 505 U.S. at 952-53 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 175. 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
The nod in the Glucksberg opinion toward Roe's statement that from the Founders to the 
19th century "wom[en] enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy" hardly 
provides a basis for protecting post-quickening abortions. See 117 S. Ct. at 2271 n.19 (quoting 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 140). The majority's history in Roe discloses that such abortions were held by 
most authorities to be illegal at common law, and illegal by statute from the mid 19th century. 
410 U.S. at 133-34. Nor does it account for the fact that this broader availability was displaced at 
the end of the 19th century by virtually universal prohibition. 
59. 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (observing that "cases involving the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment have burgeoned" in the decade before the decision and reviewing major lines 
of authority); id. at 290-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reviewing legislation on health care prox-
ies). 
60. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TruBE, ABORTION: THE CLAsH OF ABSOLUTES 49-51 {1990) 
(most existing refonns "hardly increased access to abortion"; New York's pennissive law hung by 
a thread); id. at 140 {only New York was unaffected by the ruling); see also GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 184 {1990) (New York, Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska had 
repealed abortion laws; all but New York had residency requirements). 
61. 117 S. Ct. at2269. 
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sidered a "fundamental" one.62 By the time the majority opinion reaches its 
discussion of Casey, its account of the activities the Court has protected is 
phrased in the disjunctive as those "so deeply rooted in our history and tra-
ditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered lib-
erty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."63 This could 
offer a way out of the contradiction. Perhaps the rights recognized in Roe 
and Cruzan need only be "fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty." 
While not "deeply rooted," they are at least not at odds with a "consistent 
and almost universal tradition."64 
But this escape comes at a high price to the restrained role the Glucks-
berg majority seeks to adopt. The "established methodology" of due proc-
ess becomes simply a requirement that, where the right in question has not 
been consistently rejected throughout American history, the Court thinks 
hard about the meaning of the "concept of ordered liberty." 
IV. The Constitution and the Common Lawyer: Souter's 
Concurrence 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion purports to use history to define 
the metes and bounds of unenumerated rights; it strives to constrain judicial 
intervention. But the boundaries it establishes are too narrow to encompass 
the prior cases it seeks to explain. Justice Sou~er's concurrence, by con-
trast, can explain almost any judicial intervention: he embraces a system in 
which judges are responsible to evaluate all government actions, in the 
form of what he calls "arbitrariness review."65 Although the prohibition of 
assisted suicide is sustainable, according to Justice Souter it is because that 
prohibition is, on its moral merits, not an "arbitrary" one. 
There is something enormously refreshing about reading an opinion by 
a Justice who is unashamed in his celebration of substantive due process in 
the teeth of scholarly and judicial criticism of the doctrine. Calling upon 
62. Jd. at 2269-71. Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) ("[L]ong-
standing and still extant societal tradition withholding the very right pronounced" was not present 
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). The Court in Michael H. argued that such a 
tradition precludes the classification of the right as ''Fundamental." !d. 
63. 117 S. Ct. at2271. 
64. Id. ~t2269. 
65. !d. at 2279, 2280 (Souter, J., concurring). 
Like Justice Souter, Justice Stevens' position in his separate concurrence allows the Court to 
critically evaluate state interests in areas that impact on basic freedom in matters "central to dig-
nity and autonomy," at least in relation to "making decisions about how to confront imminent 
death." !d. at 2307 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 229). Since his analysis does not add much to 
his earlier opinion in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 351-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting), I treat Justice Stevens's 
Glucksberg analysis only in passing. 
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the second Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman66 as his model, Justice 
Souter invokes ''two centuries of American constitutional practice in rec-
ognizing unenumerated, substantive limits on governmental action"67 to 
support a judicial role of protecting the "rights to be free from 'arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints'" imposed by the government in any 
area.68 Unfortunately, to be refreshed is not necessarily to be persuaded. 
A. Text, Tradition and Self Government 
No one is likely to argue in favor of "arbitrary impositions" and "pur-
poseless restraints" on the basis of their intrinsic merits. Certain long-stan-
ding doubts nonetheless persist about the source of the federal judiciary's 
authority to supplant what it regards as "arbitrary'' political actions, in the 
absence of a textual mandate in the Constitution. Justice Souter does not 
say a great deal to allay those doubts. 
Justice Souter claims to be impelled by an obligation ''to construe con-
stitutional text and review legislation for confonnity to that text[,]"69 but 
his argument in this respect is baffling. Quoting Justice Harlan's Poe dis-
sent, he notes that "[w]ere due process merely a procedural safeguard it 
would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or 
property was accomplished by legislation which ... could ••• nevertheless 
destroy the enjoyment of all three."70 This is an accurate account of a 
strictly procedural due process, but it gives no indication of why the con-
stitutional text requires anything else. 
The judicial obligation to police "arbitrary impositions" could rest on 
political postulates about the impropriety of, absolute legislative suprem-
acy71 or of actions taken without appropriate grounding in the public inter-
est.72 It might ground itself on a belief that the Constitution presupposes a 
modicum of basic morality as a prerequisite to regarding legislative enact-
ments as "law.'m But Justice Souter does not make these arguments, or 
even allude to them. 
66. 367 u.s. 497 (1961). 
67. 117 S.Ct at2277. 
68. Id. at 2282 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
69. Id. at 2281. 
70. Jd. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
71. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387-88 (1798) (Chase, J.) (''!cannot subscribe to 
the omnipotence of a state Legislature, or that it is absolute and without control."); cf. 111 S. Ct 
2281 n.7 (Souter, J., concurring) ( "[I]f it does not necessarily import this, then the legislative 
power is absolute."). 
72. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preforences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1689 (1984). 
73. Cf. Randy Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Rights in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 96 (1995) (arguing that in order to be legitimately binding stat-
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The closest Justice Souter comes to justifying "arbitrariness review" is 
his repeated reference to a ''tradition" of judicial intervention ''which has 
never been repudiated in principle."74 If common law judges are entitled to 
rely on an unbroken line of practice in the execution of their office, he 
seems to suggest, constitutional judges can do likewise. Such a tradition 
could draw on the support ofBurkean claims about social stability and the 
wisdom of accumulated experience, the role of continuity in the common 
law process, and a desire not to disappoint the expectations of citizens who 
have come to rely on the courts as a backstop against the potential excesses 
of the political branches.75 Indeed, such a tradition, if widely accepted, 
could constitute what Cass Sunstein has recently referred to as an "incom-
pletely theorized agreement,"76 supported by the convergence of a series of 
potential justifications. 
Unfortunately, Justice Souter believes that the tradition in question 
begins with Dred Scott,71 and encompasses Lochner.18 These are hardly 
cases which command broad support; a tradition that includes them is one 
whose claim to a principled allegiance from large parts of the legal or gen-
eral community is in serious dispute.79 Where Justices O'Connor and 
utes, they must be just, and judges have an obligation to review statutes for their consistency with 
the rights specified by justice). 
My own suspicion is that the natural law idea that immoral and arbitrary enactments cannot 
be legitimately considered to be "law" is the best account of a connection between the Due Proc-
ess Clause and the review that Justice Souter proposes. Cf. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388 (Chase, J.) ("An 
act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social 
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise oflegislative authority."). 
74. 117 S. Ct. at 2280 (''tradition of substantive due process review ••• [and] the Judiciary's 
obligation to cany it on"); id. at 2281 ("enduring tradition of American constitutional practice"). 
75. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877 (1996); cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 {1952) (citing Edmund Burke). 
76. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1733, 1737 
(1995). 
77. 60 u.s. 393 (1857). 
78. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
79. Justice Souter claims to avoid the mistakes of Dred Scott and Lochner by repudiating the 
use of"extratextual absolutes." 117 S. Ct. at 2281. See also id. at 2279 (cases in Lochner line 
"invoked a correct standard of constitutional arbitrariness review, [but] harbored the spirit of 
Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation."). 
It is hard to say much about Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott, since his entire due 
process analysis is contained in a.single sentence: "[A]n Act of Congress which deprives a citi-
zen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his 
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offense 
against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law." 60 U.S. at 450 
(Taney, CJ.) For myself, I find a certain cryptic moral obtuseness, but can discern no peculiarly 
"absolutist'' approach here, for everything turns on what is an "offense against the laws." 
In his characterization of the Lochner era, Justice Souter lapses into dubious history, for it 
was precisely a willingness to evaluate the relative weights of claims of public policy and private 
right that led the Lochner era courts to respond to the Brandeis briefs. Rights of property and 
contract were not regarded as absolute; courts upheld a vast array of health and safety regulations. 
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Breyer invoke nonns that can claim wide support, the potentially unlimited 
character of "arbitrariness review" combined with its noxious past robs it 
of a claim to consensus. 
B. The Method of "Arbitrariness Review" 
Whatever the deficiencies in the justifications Justice Souter provides 
for "arbitrariness review," it is worth trying to understand exactly how it 
works, for this could illuminate its legitimacy. 
As a general matter, Justice Souter embraces the obligation of judges 
to examine the "relative 'weights' or dignities of contending interests."80 
When the resolution reached by the political branches "falls outside the 
realm of the reasonable," the judiciary is obligated to invalidate the act in 
question as unconstitutional.81 
Justice Souter does not contemplate an entirely unrestrained judicial 
recalibration of the balance between public interest and private right. 
. During the Lochner era, the cases in which the Court sustained health, safety and welfare 
I!:gislation far outnwnber the cases where the legislation was invalidated. See CONGRESSIONAL 
REsEARCH SERVICE, TilE CONSTITUTION OF TilE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 92-82, at 1362-63 (1973) (listing regulations of medicine, den-
tistry, pilots, railroad engineers, grain elevators, detectives, cigarettes, cosmetics, junk dealers, 
and others upheld against substantive due process attacks). Regulations of storage of gasoline, 
public laundries, wooden buildings, and similar activities were upheld, as were regulations re-
garding garbage, food, drugs, and cosmetics. See id. at 1368, 1370-71. 
. Lochner itself invalidated limitations on hours of bakers (though it affirmed the viability of 
limitations on working conditions). 198 U.S. at 64. But the Court had previously upheld Iimita· 
tions on the hours of miners, see, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898}, and subse-
quently upheld hours limitations for women, see, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 
(1908). Cf. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); 
Rileyv. Mass. 232 U.S. 671 (1914). Ultimately, even the ten-hour day struck down when limited 
to bakers in Lochner itselfwas held to avoid "arbitrariness" when applied to all workers. Bunting 
v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426,438-39 (1917). 
Again, it is possible to construct a stronger case for a tradition of extra-textual review, be-
ginning with the popular asswnptions about unenwnerated rights in the founding generation and 
the framing of the Ninth Amendment, see, e.g., Suzanna Sheny, The Founders' Umvritten Con-
s_titution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987}, and running through early Marshall Court opinions 
(which Souter in fact cites at 117 S. Ct. at 2278}, to anti-slavery jurisprudence and the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause. Professor Black's work is perhaps the most elegant recent attempt. See 
CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTII OF FREEDoM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 
(1997). But Justice Souter does not do this. He relies simply on an observation of what the Su-
preme Court has periodically done and said. 
80. 117 S. Ct,. at2281, 2283 ("[T]he business of such review is ••• [to weigh] clashing prin-
ciples ... within the history of our values as a people. It is a comparison of the relative strengths 
of opposing claims that informs the judicial task."). "The kind and degree of justification that a 
sensitive judge would demand of a State would depend on the importance of the interest being 
asserted by the individual." Jd. at 2280. 
81. ld. at 2281. "[W]hen the legislation's justifYing principle, critically valued, is so far 
from being commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied 
••• the statute must give way." !d. at 2283. 
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Rather, the approach he advocates would apparently begin with an evalua-
tion of the "constitutional stature'' of the private claim at stake.82 In the 
absence of a threshold showing of an interest "sufficiently important to be 
judged 'fundamental' ,"83 judicial review is cursory. "At relatively trivial 
levels" of statutory imposition, the government's action84 is to be sustained 
unless "governmental restraints are undeniably irrational as unsupported by 
any imaginable rationale."85 On the other hand, for values recognized to be 
truly deserving of constitutional stature, a state may infringe on the private 
interest only if the state's 'justifying principle" is sufficiently "commensu-
rate:' with the individual interest that the legislation is not "arbitrarily or 
pointlessly applied".86 Such situations are, Justice Souter assures us, 
"suitably rare"; in making this judgment, moreover, the courts are obliged 
to defer to balances which are ''within the zone of reasonableness."87 
Thus, Justice Souter contemplates two working steps: courts must 
identify the "constitutional stature" of the individual interests asserted, and 
then determine whether the state's 'justifying principle" is reasonably 
"commensurate" with the interests.88 This may sound like cost-benefit bal-
ancing, but it apparently is not. In making each judgment, according to 
Justice Souter, the judge is obliged to use the "common law method" and 
the "usual canons of critical discourse."89 In particular, the judge is to use 
a series of "new examples and new counterexamples[,]" and compare the 
case at hand with those which have gone before.90 
Each step is problematic. 
82. Id. 
83. !d. at 2282, 2283 n.9. 
84. Justice Souter regularly writes of the review of"legislation," but then interpolates cita-
tions to the review of administrative actions. See, e.g., 117 S. Ct. at 2283 (citing Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1982)). As my colleague Matt Adler has recently written, there 
are strong reasons to believe that the legitimacy of wide-ranging judicial review may be stronger 
where the actions are those of administrative agencies. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint 
in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759 
(1997). And as I have suggested elsewhere, the great bulk of constitutional intervention by the 
judiciary occurs in non-legislative arenas. Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judi-
cial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARYBILLOFRTS. J. 427 (1997). 
85. 117 S. Ctat2282. 
86. I d. at 2283. A state "may prevail only on the ground of an interest sufficiently compel-
ling to place within the realm of the reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right as-
serted." !d. at 2282. 
87. Id. at2281-82. 
88. I d. at 2283. 
89. Id. at2284. 
90. Id. 
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I. Identifying "Certain Interests" 
In determining the "weight or dignity" of the individual interest as-
s,erted, Justice Souter clearly does not mean the court should simply evalu-
ate whether the interest is important to the individual asserting it, or to the 
reasonable person in the individual's position. Carolene Products Corpo-
ration, after all, could have been put out of business by the challenged fed-
eral legislation, but Justice Souter characterizes the company's interest as 
"trivial."91 Rather, Justice Souter maintains that in determining the 
''weight'' of the interest asserted, the court is obliged to limit its recognition 
to those values ''truly deserving constitutional stature, either to those ex-
pressed in constitutional text, or those exemplified by 'the traditions from 
which [the Nation] developed', or [those] revealed by contrast with 'the 
traditions from which it broke. "'92 
Taken on its own terms, this is not much of a limitation. The ''values 
expressed in the constitutional text'' are capacious. Both Due Process 
Clauses, after all, protect "life, liberty, and property." After augmenting 
these clearly expressed textual values with the Founders' regard for "the 
pursuit of happiness," and the enumeration of":fundamental" privileges and 
immunities in Corfield v. Coryell, 93 it is difficult identify a serious interest 
that would not rise to "constitutional stature," even without a reference to 
other ''traditions." 
But, read charitably, Justice Souter may be saying that text and his-
torical practice simply provide the raw materials that courts must work with 
to evaluate the "fundamentality" of the interests in question. Not every ef-
fort to pursue happiness need be regarded as. fundamental, but only those 
that the Court through the "common law method'' concludes play a crucial 
role in the American polity.94 In this case, apparently, the "common law 
method" is one of reasoning by analogy. 
Justice Souter gives as a parade example of the way in which the pro-
cess should work his account of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe. According 
to Justice Souter, the Harlan dissent used the common law method to as-
certain that marital contraceptive use was encompassed within the "certain 
91. /d. at 2282. 
92. /d. at2383 (quotingPoev. Ullman, 367U.S. 497,542 (1961)). 
93. 6 F. Cas. 546,551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230) ("[p]rotection by the government; 
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and posses property of every kind, and 
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety"). Justice Souter cites Justice Harlan's invocation of 
Corjield as a proper example of a court identifYing "fundamental" rights. 117 S. Ct. at 2282. 
94. Justice Souter is fond of the "common law method." He uses the phrase no fewer than 
four times in two pages. See 117 S. Ct. at 2283-84. 
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interests requir[ing] particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted 
to justify their abridgment."95 • • 
Seeking to employ the same method, Justice Souter argues in Glucks-
berg that the "liberty interest in bodily integrity" has been recognized in the 
common law of battery which prohibits medical invasions and forced 
medication, the constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, and · 
the constitutional right against government prohibitions of medical aid in 
obtaining an abortion, as well as the "high value traditionally placed on the 
medical relationship," and the authorization by many states to administer 
analgesic medication which may hasten death.96 He concludes that the 
"importance of the individual interest here .•• cannot be gainsaid."97 
All of this may be quite sensible reasoning by analogy, if the question 
were presented to a common law court whether assisted suicide should be a 
tort or a common law crime. But the state of Washington has already exer-
cised its legislative power to pre-empt common law decision-making, and, 
as Justice Marshall defined the Court's duty in such cases, "it is a constitu-
tion we are expounding.''98 I like a good analogy as well as the next law 
professor, but is assisted suicide appropriately analogized to abortion, the 
use of psychoactive drugs, wearing long hair, body piercing, or murder? 
What Justice Souter has not done is to identify how the analogies he 
chooses map into the Court's constitutional mandate.99 
Inspired by Justice Souter, I went back to re-read Justice Harlan's Poe 
dissent, and alas, it appears that Justice Souter does not quite live up to the 
model he invokes. Justice Harlan does begin his Poe dissent with the 
proposition that Souter quotes: that in assaying a law's congruence with 
the "balance our nation has struck between •.. liberty and the demands of 
organized society[,] ••. certain interests require particularly careful scru-
tiny of state needs asserted to justify their abridgement.''100 
To identify those interests, however, Justice Harlan looks not simply 
to historical or common law practice in America, but to the purposes he 
95. !d. at 2282. 
96. !d. at2287-88. 
97. !d. at2290. 
98. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
99. This uncritical importation of the "common law method" into constitutional adjudication 
is particularly mystifying given Justice Souter's strong account last Term of the "Framer's [fear 
of] judicial power over substantive policy and the ossification of law that would result from trans-
forming common law into constitutional law." Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 
1114, 1176 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
100. 367 U.S. at 543. 
882 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUAR.TERL Y [Vol. 24:863 
discerns in the Constitution itself.101 True, Justice Harlan adopts the 
proposition that the ''the privacy of the home ... by common understanding 
throughout the English speaking world, must be granted to be a most fun-
dfUDental aspect of 'Iiberty."'102 But, he does not rest with an account of 
Anglophone public opinion; he argues in support of the proposition that 
this protection of the home is a part ofihe purposes of the Constitution. 
Beginning with the Third and Fourth Amendments' protections 
against quartering troops and unreasonably searching the home, Justice 
Harlan argues that ''the rational purposes, historical roots and subsequent 
development of the relevant provisions" support the constitutional protec-
tion of privacies within the home.103 Because the constitutional protection 
constitutes a "rational continuum,"104 the Court is entitled to look to other 
constitutional provisions and constructions in elaborating a non-textual 
protection that coheres with the remainder of the Constitution. The Court 
can legitimately claim to be exercising its warrant of construing the Con-
stitution because the basic building blocks come from the Constitution it-
self.105 This is precisely what Justice Souter's use of ''the common law 
method" fails to do.106 
101. See id. at 544 ("Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against 
a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and historically 
developed."). 
Again, in defming the importance of the principles of free speech, "[i]t is the purposes of 
those guarantees and not their text, the reasons for their statement by the Framers and not the 
statement itself, which have led to their present status." /d. (internal citations omitted). 
102. /d. at548. 
103. /d. at 550. Harlan's account begins with Justice Brandeis's vision of the purposes of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments as embodying the "right to be let alone"; it continues through the 
"sweep of the Court's decisions" under the Fourth 'and Fourteenth Amendments to conclude that 
"the home [which is the subject of Fourth Amendment protection] derives its preeminence as the 
seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been 
found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional 
right" I d. at 550-52. 
104. Id. at 543. 
105. The protection ofliberties by this methodology is, in Harlan's use, constrained by his-
torical common law practice; "intimacies which the law has always forbidden and which can have 
no claim to social protection" cannot claim protection of the Constitution under Harlan's princi-
ple. /d. at 553. The impetus for protection, however must come from the constitutional tapestry. 
Seeid. 
106. I am not at all sure that a truly Harlanesque argument could be constructed for a consti-
tutionally dignified right of access to medical assistance in committing suicide. Medical care it-
self has long been a regulated and regulable activity. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 
114, 121-22 (1889) (upholding constitutionality of medical licensing); see also United States v. 
R!Jtherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) {upholding constitutionality of federal drug regulation prohibit-
ing laetrile for use by tenninally ill cancer patients). And the right to avoid government impinge-
ments on bodily welfare has been recognized, almost exclusively outside of the abortion cases and 
in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 {1976), as a right against the government's active intrusion on 
bodily integrity. 
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2. "Relative Weights of Contending Interests" 
Assuming that a light of "constitutional stature" has been identified by 
the "common law method," the second step of Justice Souter's analysis re-
quires the Court to detennine whether the state's 'justifying principle" is 
arbitrarily incommensurate with the iinposition.107 This is not the place to 
rehearse the on-going barrage of criticism that has been directed at the pro-
cess of ''weighing'' individual liberties against state interests in defining 
constitutional rights.108 Again, charitably construed, Justice Souter does 
not necessarily require courts to :fmely evaluate the relative importance of 
the contending interests at the margins. Rather, he claims that the Court's 
only role is to identify a disproportion between the state's claims and those 
of the individual so great as to be described as "arbitrary"; only such arbi-
trary disproportions justify judicial intervention. Any interest that could 
reasonably be judged to be of a magnitude comparable to the one infringed 
will be adequate. Giving Justice Souter the further benefit of his invoca-
tion of Justice Harlan and the "common law method," it is further possible 
to define this "arbitrariness review" not in tenns of the independent judg-
ment of the Court in a particular instance, but in tenns of a comparison 
between the tradeoff at issue here and those which have been sanctioned 
elsewhere in constitutional jurisprudence or settled tradition.109 
Having detennined that the interest of tenninal patients in obtaining 
medical assistance in ending their lives is constitutionally "important," 
Justice Souter nonetheless concludes that the interest in maintaining a sys-
The strongest argument seems to me the claim of spiritual integrity of the sort advanced by 
Justice Stevens, but to the extent that objections are keyed to consequentialist dangers, it is hard to 
invoke this claim wiUt sufficient force. 
107. G/ucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2283. 
108. For classic attacks, see, for example, Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
865 (1960); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1441-50 
(1962); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 
CAL. L. REv. 729, 746-48 (1963); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALELJ. 943 (1987); C. Edwin Baker, Unseasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory 
Parade Permits and Time, Place and Manner Regulation, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 937 (1983); Anto-
nio Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Mark Tuslmet, 
Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1502 (1985). 
I have elsewhere argued that the attacks are, for some rights, misdirected. See SeUt F. Kre-
imer, Sunlight, Secrets and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in 
Constitutional Law, 140 U. PENN. L. REv. 1, 108-42 (1991). 
109. By analogy, for Justice Harlan, the balance in question is not one reached by independent 
judicial evaluation, but "the balance which our Nation. : • has struck between liberty and the de-
mands of organized society." Poe, 367 U.S. at 542. "The balance of which I speak is the balance 
struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it de-
veloped as well as the traditions from which it broke." !d. At the point that he actually evaluated 
the balance in Poe, the decisive consideration for Justice Harlan was the ''utter novelty of the en-
actment," the fact that in the nation as a whole, no other governmental entity had applied a crimi-
nal prohibition directly to marital use of contraceptives. !d. at 554. 
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tern which "protect[s] terminally ill patients from involuntary suicide and 
euthanasia, both voluntary and non-voluntary," is adequate to justify the 
state's prohibition.U0 As Justice Souter constructs the argument, this is not 
a hard call. 
Justice Souter puts to one side the state's claim of an interest in pro" 
tecting life generally, or of discouraging knowing and voluntary suicides, 
suggesting that "a moral judgment contrary to respondent's" may not be 
adequate to the task of counterbalancing the interests invoked.m Rather, 
he relies on the "dispositive" weight ofthe potential dangers of mistaken or 
involuntary suicide and euthanasia.112 The decision to prohibit assisted 
suicide need not rest on morally controverted grounds, for, according to the 
states which defend the laws, a system which permits assisted suicide will 
likewise entail the risk of lethal abuse and mistake. "[M]istaken decisions 
may result from inadequate palliative care or a terminal prognosis that turns 
out to be error; coercion and abuse may stem from the large medical bills 
that family members cannot bear or unreimbursed hosp~tals decline to 
shoulder."113 A system which allows assisted suicide provides some citi-
zens with a desired end to a painful and debilitated life, according to Jus-
tice Souter, but puts others at risk of having their life ended against their 
will. The state cannot grant release to some without imposing danger on 
others, and no one doubts the state's interest in protecting all of its citizens 
from being killed involuntarily. 
In this tragic balance, according to Justice Souter, the importance of"a 
State's interest in protecting those unable to make responsible decisions 
and those who make no decisions at all" against the termination of their 
lives "is beyond question";114 it is of a quality commensurate with the in-
terests that prohibition infringes. On the empirical question of the magni-
tude of the risk in question, Justice Souter professes to be agnostic, but in 
the absence of a clear showing that the risk is minimal, he is unwilling to 
say that the legislature has acted arbitrarily .115 
110. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2290-91 (citingBriefforPetitionerat34-35). 
111. Id. 
112. See id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 2292. 
115. "The day may come when we can say with some assurance which side is right, but for 
now it is the substantiality of the factual disagreement, and the alternatives for resolving it, that 
matter •••• [T]he basic concept of judicial. review ••• bars any finding that a legislature has acted 
arbitrarily when ••• there is a serious factual controversy over the feasibility of recognizing the 
claimed right without at the same time making it impossible for the State to engage in an undoubt-
edly legitimate exercise of power; facts necessary to resolve the controversy are not readily as-
certainable through the judicial process; but they are more readily subject to discovery through 
legislative factfmding and experimentation." Id. 
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At one level, I can have no objection to this analysis, since it tracks 
one that I have previously suggested.116 At another level, however, Justice 
Souter is misleading when he suggests that the key rests in a "legislature's 
superior opportunities to obtain the facts necessary for a judgment about 
the present controversy," or that "facts currently unknown could be dis-
·positive,'' and goes on to intimate that "legislative foot-dragging in ascer-
taining the facts" could form the basis for judicial intervention.117 
Certainly, constitutional analysis must start with the facts. The plain-
tiffs before the Court suffered pain and physical debilitation; there is every 
reason to expect that their situations were not unique.118 On the other hand, 
it is also clear that in the experiment with legalization of assisted suicide in 
the Netherlands, some patients have been subjected to life ending interven-
tions ''without explicit request,"119 and there is every reason to expect an 
American experiment to prove at least equally problematic. 
It is possible that a consensus will emerge that all physical pain can be 
medically addressed, and the legalization in Holland or Oregon (should it 
survive) will prove so extensively and unambiguously lethal that the justifi-
cation for prohibition will be placed beyond question. Conversely, legali-
zation could go so smoothly that it will become utterly clear that there are 
no dangers of collateral consequences, and prohibition of assisted suicide is 
utterly without justification aside from moral opposition.120 But for any-
thing between these extremes, facts are unlikely to resolve the matter of 
constitutional mandate.121 
First, consider the dangers attending legalization. Suppose that reli-
able estimates are available which would lead any legislator to conclude 
legalization of assisted suicide will lead to the death of only 10 individuals 
116. See Kreimer, supra note 12. 
117. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2293. 
118. See, e.g., J. Addington-Hall et al., Dyingfrom Cancer: Results of an National Popula-
tion-based Investigation, 9 PAlLIATIVE MEDICINE 295 (1995) (1/3 of tenninal cancer patients 
experience great pain); Joanne Lynn, M.D., et al., Perceptions by Family Members of the Dying 
Experience of Older and Seriously Ill Patients, 126 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED 97 (1997) (55% 
of all patients surveyed spent the last three days of their life conscious and in pain); SUPPORT 
Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients, 274 
JAMA 1591, 1594 (1995) (50% oftenninal patients in study who died in hospital experienced 
moderate or severe pain at least half of the time during their last 3 days oflife). 
119. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2291-92. 
120. For Justice Harlan, whom Justice Souter claims as a model;moral opposition could be an 
adequate basis for most exercises of the police power. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). 
Justice Souter, however, may be inclined to conclude that unadorned moral judgments are not 
adequate to justify the particularly burdensome laws at issue here without more. Such a principle 
certainly could justify the outcomes in Roe and Casey. 
121. This is not to say that facts may not be of importance to policy-makers seeking to choose 
among the wide spectrum of constitutionally acceptable policies. 
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per year in circumstances that are not substantially competent, informed 
and voluntary. Suppose that it can be reliably shown that there are no other 
dynamic effects. At the same time, suppose that equally reliable estimates 
suggest that 1000 individuals who would honestly and legitimately see 
death as a release from physical and spiritual agony will be able to escape 
those circumstances every year because of the legalization of physician as-
sisted suicide. Would a legislative choice to retain the prohibition be un-
constitutionally "arbitrary"? 
The answer turns not on the facts that the legislature finds, but on the 
values it is entitled to embody in law. According to one recent report, 69 
people in the last quarter century have been released from death row be-
cause they were later found to be factually innocent.122 For opponents of 
the death penalty this seems strong evidence that the penalty is unaccept-
able, even if it has a deterrent impact on murders ·in a much larger number 
of cases. Even if one disagrees with that judgment-which I do not-it 
would be hard to characterize it as "arbitrary." The crucial moral issue is 
not how many lives are at issue on each side, but the evaluation of the rela-
tive moral import of saving innocent lives by deterrence and risking taking 
them by official act. 
So too with assisted suicide. When comparing the risk of a small 
number of involuntary deaths with the benefit of a large number of escapes 
from suffering it is not enough to count bodies. Plausible moral judgments 
could claim that death is incalculably worse than suffering, 123 or that the 
distributional consequences of imposing a risk of death which falls most 
heavily on the least advantaged members of society outweighs the cost to a 
broader class of relatively privileged individuals who will feel a loss of 
dignity in their last days.124 Moreover, countervailing and plausible inde-
terminate concerns point to potential second and third order effects on the 
medical profession, the willingness of the victims of debilitating disease to 
seek to endure rather than escape, the incentives to improve palliative care, 
and the regard for the terminally ill. None of these issues are likely to be 
factually determinate. 
122. Richard C. Dieter, Innocence and the Death Penalty: The Increasing Danger of Exe-
cuting the Innocent (visited March 22, 1998) <http://www.essential.orglorgs/dpic(mn.html>. 
123. Compare Alastair Norcross, Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives, 26 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFFAIRS 135 (1997) (discussing arguments for and against sacrificing lives to avoid suf-
fering) with Lany S. Temkin, A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 
175, 191 (1996) (arguing that the sacrifice oflives to avoid suffering is immoral). 
124. White men tend to view risks as systematically lower and more acceptable than females 
and non-whites. James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perception of Environmental Health 
Risks, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1101, 1102 (1994). 
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Once countervailing considerations are qualitatively commensurate 
with the suffering that attends prohibition, legislatures are entitled to the 
final word in resolving these dilemmas. They are entitled, not because they 
are better' fact-fmders than courts, but because within broad constitutional 
constraints popularly elected legislators are entitled to exercise independent 
moraljudgment. No factual developments are likely to change this. 
The same is, of course, true on the other side. If it turns out that only 
10 Americans must live for 10 days each evezy year in physical agony as a 
price of a prohibition that saves 1000 depressed or vulnerable Americans 
from being induced to end their lives without full and voluntazy consent, 
one might conclude that a cost-benefit accounting requires prohibition. But 
a legislative detremination that a commitment to individual liberty in mat-
ters of high moral import dominates the need to protect the vulnerable from 
potential misuse of that liberty could not be condemned as arbitrazy. This 
is so, not because the legislature is a "better fact fmder'' than the Court, but 
because its value commitments are constitutionally legitimate. 
V. Constitutional Law as Common Decency 
If Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter's opinions were the only ones 
in Glucksberg, an observer might be justified in concluding that substantive 
due process analysis has lost its germinal potential, and that the abortion 
cases maintain what vitality they have only by grace of stare decisis. But 
Justice Rehnquist wrote for only four of his fellow Justices, and one of 
those-Justice O'Connor--filed a concurrence. Justice O'Connor, as the 
senior author of the joint plurality of Casey, seems more likely to success-
fully reconcile the abortion cases and Glucksberg than Justice Rehnquist 
who, after all, was not enamored of Roe from the beginning. In addition to 
joining the Glucksberg majority, Justice O'Connor authored a separate 
brief and somewhat cryptic concurrence, which drew the adherence of Jus- · 
tices Ginsburg and Breyer. Together with the concurrence of Justice 
Breyer, Justice O'Connor's opinion bears the seeds of a persuasive synthe-
sis of Casey and Glucksberg. 
A. The Abortion and Gender: A Road Not Taken 
The Casey plurality brought to the fore the importance of gender to the 
analysis of abortion. The link between control of reproductive capacity and 
the capacity to transcend traditional gender roles appeared several times in 
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the joint opinion's analysis.125 I have argued elsewhere that one basis for 
distinguishing abortion from assisted suicide is abortion's special salience 
for women.126 Unlike a prohibition on abortion, a prohibition on assisted 
suicide does not require any defmable social group in the population to 
bear a concentrated burden for the benefit of society's moral choices. Nor 
does it threaten to lock members of a previously subordinated group into a 
set of social roles to which they have been relegated in the past by societal 
expectations. 
The analysis of gender is largely absent, however, from the discussion 
in Gluc~berg. Justice O'Connor's concurrence gives the general issue of 
equality attention in the following fashion: 
Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family 
member's tenninal illness. There is no reason to think the democratic 
process will not strike the proper balance between the interests oftenni-
nally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end their 
suffering and the State's interests in ¥rotecting those who might seek to 
end life mistakenly or under pressure. 27 
Given the facts of biology, the composition of state legislatures and 
the tradition of selective indifference to the effects of childbearing on the 
status of women, a similar statement about abortion would sound distinctly 
hollow. None of the other discussion in any of the opinions, however, 
picks up this thread.128 
B. The Problem of Pain 
Justice O'Connor's concurrence contains a second evocative theme, 
one which rings potentially controlling echoes in other opinions. She inti-
125. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (state cannot insist on its own vision of woman's role by 
mandating child-bearing); id. at 856 ("ITJhe ability of women to participate equally in the eco· 
nomic and social life of the Nation is facilitated by their [right to obtain abortions]"); id. at 896 
(rejection of traditional subservient role of women in family implies rejection of husband notifi· 
cation requirement); id. at 928 (Biaclanun, J., concurring) (arguing that prohibition of abortion 
denies women equal status). See also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct 753, 
789-92, 802-04 (1993) (Stevens, J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Ginsbmg 
has previously suggested that the link between pregnancy and gender would have been a better 
basis for Roe. See Ginsburg, supra note 21. 
126. See Kreimer, supra note 12, at 849-53. 
127. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct at2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
128. Issues of equality appear on the other side of the scales in the majority's discussion of 
the State's "interest in protecting vulnerable groups •.• from abuse, neglect and mistakes." /d. at 
2273. The concern with an "insidious bias against the handicapped" and the protection of "dis-
abled and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes," and social 
indifference, as well as an account of Washington's claim that "all persons's Jives ••• regardless 
of physical or mental condition are under full protection of the Jaw" suggest that a concern for 
equality of burdens weighs against recognizing a right of assisted suicide. /d. at 2272-73 (citing 
Compassion in Dying. 19 F.3d at 592-93). 
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mates that she might acknowledge a "constitutionally cognizable interest in 
obtaining relief from the suffering [patients] may experience in the last 
days of their lives" in circumstances different from the ones before the 
Court.129 By "suffering," Justice O'Connor apparently means patients in 
"great pain," of the sort that can be alleviated by the medication that is in 
fact available in both New York and W ashington.130 
Justice Breyer, who joins Justice O'Connor's opinion, emphasizes in 
his separate opinion the "legal significance" of Justice O'Connor's 
views.131 Justice Breyer's separate concurrence suggests that he might find 
a basis in "our legal tradition" for a "right to die with dignity'' compounded 
of elements of personal dignity, medical treatment and freedom from state-
inflicted pain.132 But for Justice Breyer, like Justice O'Connor, "the avoid-
ance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would have to com-
prise an essential part of any successful claim."133 
This focus on physical suffering raises immediate questions. Justices 
O'Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer are aware that the process of dying carries 
with it the prospect of suffering that extends beyond the physical. Justice 
O'Connor begins her opinion by contemplating the prospect of ''the despair 
that [perhaps] accompanies·physical deterioration and loss of control of ba-
sic bodily and mental functions."134 Physical suffering is not the most 
common source of desire for assisted suicide, either in the Netherlands 
where it is legal or, as best as one can determine, in the United States where 
it is extra-lega1.135 Indeed, the plaintiffs in Glucksberg complained of both 
129. 117 S. Ct. at2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
130. Jd. 
131. I d. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
132. Jd. at2311. 
133. Jd. ("[the] avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical suffering''). "New York and 
Washington do not force a dying person to undergo that kind of pain." Jd. State laws "do not in~ 
terfere by bringing the State's police powers to bear." Jd. at 2312. "Were state law to pre-
vent. •• the administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life-the Jaw's impact 
upon serious and otherwise unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death) would be more di-
rectly at issue." I d. 
'134. Jd. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
135. For the United States, see, e.g., William Breitbar et al., Interest in Physician Assisted 
Suicide Among Ambulatory HIV Infected Patients, 153 AM. J. PYSCH. 238, 241 (1996) (finding 
no correlation between pain and desire for assisted suicide); Anthony L. Black et al., Physician 
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State 275 JAMA 919 (1996) (stating that 75% of 
patients requesting assisted suicide or euthanasia were concerned about being a burden to their 
families; 35% were concerned about experiencing severe pain); Robert Blendon et al., Should 
Physicians Aid their Patients in Dying?: The Public Perspective, 267 JAMA 2568, 2660 (1992) 
(stating that among those who would consider ending their lives in case of a tenninal illness, 47% 
cited "fears ofburdening their families," 20% cited fear of pain). 
For the Netherlands, see, e.g., Johanna H. Groenewoud, Physician-Assisted Death in Psychi-
atric Practice in the Netherlands, 336 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1795 {1997) (stating that among 
psychiatric patients requesting assisted suicide or euthanasia, 68% cited the absence of any hope 
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pain and indignity. As Justice Souter emphasizes, "The patients here 
sought not only an end to pain (which they might have had, although per-
haps at the price of stupor) but an end to their short remaining lives with a 
dignity that they believed would be denied them by powerful pain medica-
tion, as well as by their consciousness of dependency and helplessness as 
they approached death."136 
Why, then, do Justices Breyer and O'Connor focus on physical pain as 
the touchstone of a possible constitutional right? What might be the prove-
nance and dimensions of this focus on physical pain? 
1. Legal Sources 
A discemable line of cases extends some constitutional cognizance to 
the bodily integrity of the individual. The line begins in the 19th century; it 
flourishes most recently in Cruzan and Casey.131 But this right does not 
necessarily relate to pain; it is grounded in "rights to bodily integrity and 
freedom from unwanted touching,'' and asserts the citizen's sovereign con-
trol over all aspects of her person.138 The earliest of this line of cases, Un-
ion Pacific RR Co. v. Botsford, involved a medical examination to be con-
4ucted "in [a] manner not to expose the person of the plaintiff in any 
indelicate manner."139 These cases contemplate a right to assert saver-
of improvement, 29% cited a desire not to be a burden to others, 18% cited pain or physical suf-
fering); Paul J. Van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the 
End of Life, 338 LANCET 669, 672 (1991) (stating that pain was the reason for request for assisted 
suicide or euthanasia in less than half of cases); G. van der Wal et al., Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide II: Do Dutch Family Doctors Act Prudently?, 9 FAM. PRAC. 135, 138 (1992) (same). 
136. 117 S. Ct. at 2289 (Souter, J., concurring). Plaintiffs ''would have chosen such a suicide 
for the sake of personal dignity, apart even from relief from pain." /d. at 2276. Justice Stevens 
also alludes to the issue in passing: "avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living one's 
final days incapacitated and in agony." /d. at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring); "[t]he interests of a 
person who because of pain, incapacity or sedation finds her life intolerable." /d. at 2308. 
137. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 ("It is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments 
in Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a per-
son's ••• bodily integrity." (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); Winston 
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952))). See also Cruzan, 497 
U.S. at 269 (citing Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); 497 U.S. at 
287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Because our notions of liberty are inextricably intertwined with 
our idea of physical freedom and self determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions 
into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause," (citing Rachin, 342 
U.S. 165; Botsford, 141 U.S. 250; Winston, 470 U.S. 753; Schmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757 
.(1966))). 
138. See Vacca, 117 S. Ct. at2301. 
139. 141 u.s. 250. 
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eignty over one's own body by avoiding any unwanted touching; the physi-
cal impingement need not necessarily involve the infliction of pain.140 
The issue in these cases is, for the most part, one of the degree of in-
trusion into self-sovereignty; pain is at most an element in the calculus of 
constitutionality.141 Moreover, these cases involve common law batteries-
actions by others that impinge on the bodily integrity of the individual from 
the outside. Governmental prohibitions of actions which affect an individ-
ual own body have not regularly invoked any similar level of constitutional 
scrutiny.142 And the right provided by these cases is not a strong one, it can 
be overbalanced by legitimate, not necessarily compelling, state interests.143 
There is, however, another line of cases where pain plays a more cen-
tral, powerful, and determinative role .. The Eighth Amendment's ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment directly addresses the perception that the 
Constitution should prevent the state from being party to the infliction of 
brutal pain on its citizens. Whatever else it prohibits, there is a fair consen-
sus that the Eighth Amendment will not allow state officials knowingly to 
impose brutal pain even on those convicted of heinous crimes. Even for 
those sentenced to death, the Court has held for more than a century that "it 
is safe to affirm that punishments of torture ... and all others in the same 
line of unnecessary cruelty ... are forbidden."144 "Unnecessary and wan-
140. In Cruzan, the plaintiff was in a persistent vegetative state and there is no indication the 
feeding tube was painful. See 491 U.S. at 266. In Winston, the operation was to be carried out 
under anaesthesia. See 470 U.S. at 764. 
141. Cf. Schmerber, 384 U.S at 771 ("[Blood test] involves virtually no risk, trauma or 
pain"); Winston, 410 U.S. at 761 (pain is an element of the "extent to which the procedure may 
threaten the safety or health of the individual''); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (intrusion might not be 
allowed if it "would seriously impair ••• health, or. • • cause ••• death"). 
142. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (use of unproven and unlicensed 
medication); Minnesota ex rei. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921) (use of narcotics); 
cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (same). 
Casey, of course, expands the concept of bodily integrity to include control of abortion, and 
several justices in Glucksberg further expand the concept. Susan Wolf argues, with some persua-
siveness, that Casey bears a family resemblance to prior cases because it involves the exclusion of 
an unwanted external element (the fetus) from the woman's body and seeks a return to the status 
quo before the unwanted external element. Susan Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Abortion, 
and Treatment Refusal: Using Gender to Analyze the Difforence, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED 
SUICIDE: ETIIICAL PosmoNS, MEDICAL PRACI1CE, AND PUBLIC POUCY OPTIONS 167 (Robert 
Weir ed. 1997). She suggests that the exclusion of this unwanted external element is of particular 
importance to women. 
Whether or not this analogy is ultimately persuasive, the abortion cases, which I treat below, 
are the only bodily integrity cases that speak to the issue of government prohibition of self-
sovereignty outside of the realm of physical battery. 
143. In Botsford, for example, the result seems to tum on the absence of precedent "in a per-
sonal action," as opposed to examinations in criminal cases or divorces. where such examination 
wouldbepermitted. 141 U.S.at252. 
144. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1&79). 
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ton infliction of physical pain" has been universally conceded to be outside 
of the scope of legitimate punishment.145 So, too, even before the Court 
applied the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination to the 
states, torture to obtain criminal convictions was outside of the moral uni-
verse delineated by the Constitution. The concept of ordered liberty im-
plied that "[t]he rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the 
witness stand."146 
Physical confinement by the government, or even bondage, may be ac-
ceptable under appropriate circumstances;147 raw imposition of pain is not. 
As applied to capital cases, the boundaries of the prohibition on torture have allowed sub-
stantial pain to accompany execution. Compare Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1237-39 (1983) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring in denial of certiorari) with id. at 1240-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (describing gruesome and painful death by cyanide gas which can extend over 
several minutes); Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct., 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting from vacation of stay) (describing painful death from cyanide gas which extended over ten 
minutes); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari) (describing electrocution as a painful experience lasting several minutes). 
The Court has, nonetheless suggested that lingering and excruciating pain is out of bounds 
even for executions. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (commenting that "punish-
ments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death") (upholding electrocution); Louisi-
ana ex ref. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (observing that ''the traditional hu-
manity of modem Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution 
of the death sentence [as part of the] prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain."). 
145. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (denial of medical care for "serious 
medical needs" violates the Eighth Amendment) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976)); 429 U.S. at 103 ("[U]nnecessary suffering is inconsistant with contemporary standards 
of decency."); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31, (1993) (reaffirming Estelle: Eighth 
4ntendment prohibits unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); id. at 33 (conditions of con-
finement that are sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering violate the 
Constitution); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. I (1992) (reaffirming "general requirement" that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes ''unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or torture, even if 
no serious physical injury eventuates); id. at 26 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (''Diabolic or inhuman 
punishmentS by defmition inflict serious injury. That is not to say the injury must be, or always 
will be, physical. •Many things ••• may cause agony as they occur yet leave no enduring injury. 
The state is not free to inflict such pains without just cause."') (quoting Williams v. Boles, 841 
F.2d 181, (7th Cir. 1988))); cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) ("cruelty by 
laws .•• inflicting bodily pain or mutilation" was core evil at which Eighth Amendment was di-
rected); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1891) (Field, J., dissenting) (''[The] designa-
tion • • • is usually applied to punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, 
the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with acute pain and suffer-
ing.") 
To violate the Eighth Amendment, the imposition in question must be the result of either in-
tent or deliberate indifference, see, e.g. Farmer v. Brennan; 511 U.S. 82$, 834 (1994), but !mow l-
edge of the situation of the patients affected by the ban on assisted suicide can hardly be dis-
avowed. Id. at 843 n.8; cf. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 n.13 (citing Resweber, 329 U.S. 459) 
(unconstitutional cruelty can result from "a series of abortive attempts, or a single cruelly willful 
attempt")). 
146. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1936). 
147. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) {denial of bail for dangerous 
individuals); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 (1997) (incarceration of "sexually vio-
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Ifthere are certain physical sensations that the state cannot legitimately in-
flict on prisoners in retaliation even for the most heinous of crimes, pre-
sumably the state similarly may not inflict them on innocent individuals.148 
There may be some novelty in suggesting that the state is constitution-
ally barred not only :from directly imposing severe pain, but also from pre-
venting the alleviation of physical suffering caused by other forces. But 
Estelle, two decades ago, concluded that deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs of prisoners can impose constitutionally impermissible 
''wanton and unnecessary pain."149 Indeed, one of the examples cited by 
the Court in Estelle as "cruel and unusual punishment'' was refusal to ad-
minister a prescribed pain killer to prisoners after surgery.150 
2. Pain or Suffering? 
The focus on physical pain accords with a particular conception of the 
role of courts in enforcing unenumerated rights. Under this view, the con-
straints of the unwritten constitution are invoked most legitimately, not in 
support of an effort to assure the ·best that government can achieve, but in 
an effort to avoid the worst. Thus, most members of the Court have been 
reluctant to mandate an affirmative provision of benefits, but have been 
less constrained in preventing physical abuse by government officials. In 
the days before the incorporation of the Bill of Rights' protections regard-
ing criminal procedure agailist the states, physical brutality was often the 
Court's touchstone in determining whether the efforts of law enforcement 
lent predator'); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1982) (physical restraint of 
mental patient); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1990) (forced medication of pris-
oner). 
148. Cf. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321 (persons involuntarily committed are entitled to more 
considerate treatment than criminals); Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 
(1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 nn.I6-17 (1979). · 
Indeed in his concurrence in Resweber, 329 U.S. at 469, Justice Frankfurter viewed the pro-
hibition of willful infliction of great physical cruelty in a manner that violates standards of de-
cency to be a part of the due process protection of"principles of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 
In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 n.39 (1977), the Court rejected an argument that 
the Eighth Amendment extended of its own force to constrain disciplinary paddling of students in 
school, and suggested that no real threat of abuse was present because state common law and stat· 
ute guarded against "excessive physical punishment." The Court specifically refused to address 
the contention that substantive due process barred punishments as to students that would be un-
constitutional as to convicted criminals. See id. at 659 n.l2. 
149. 429 U.S. 97; cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) {denial of surgery necessary to re-
pair prisoner's Achilles tendon can constitute Eighth Amendment violation). 
150. 429 U.S. at 104 n.IO. 
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were at odds with deeply rooted tradition;151 actions that shock the con-
science have often involved active imposition of physical harm.152 
The issue of assisted suicide provokes violent debates over what out-
come should be regarded as "the worst'' that government can wreak. From 
Patrick Henry's claim to regard death as preferable to the loss of liberty to 
the periodic espousal of the ideal of death before dishonor, parts of our 
cultural heritage support a perception that the senses of dependency and 
loss of control that accompany terminal illness can be worse than death it-
self. This belief, however, is far from universal. Other elements of our 
heritage dispute the perception that dependence and physical or mental in-
capacity reduce dignity. What some experience as degrading dependency, 
others regard as a physical condition that simply highlights the interde-
pendence in which all human beings function. Indeed, with the rise of the 
disability rights movement, the claims that physical limitation is anathema 
to human dignity assume a potentially invidious character. And, of course, 
a strand of our heritage denies that a chosen death is ever an appropriate 
response to suffering.153 
For the Court to embody a moral perception in a constitutional man-
date, the Justices properly seek commitments that can claim a broad if not 
universal consent. In an increasingly diverse culture, the definition of dig-
nity or mental suffering is not likely to provide that touchstone.154 The fo-
cus on physical agony seeks to fmd that archimedean point in the experi-
ence of physical pain. 
To the extent that public opinion is relevant, it seems that the public 
support in the United States currently for assisted suicide is focused in 
large measure on cases where suicide is the only alternative to physical suf-
fering.155 This breadth of support is hardly surprising. Pain is a basic 
151. See e.g. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 
(1957); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); 
Brown, 297 U.S. 278. 
152. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
153. Thus, the very controverted nature of dignity, which some proponents of assisted suicide 
see as a basis for excluding the state from prohibiting particular modes of writing life's last chap-
ter, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 216-17 (1993), is itself a reason to be dubious of using 
dignity as the basis for overturning laws which plausibly rest on claims to protect others from 
physical danger and suffering. 
154. A comparable issue was raised this Term in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. 
Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2117 (1997), where the subjectivity of emotional suffering led the Court to 
reject a claim seeking tort recovery under the FELA for emotional distress in the absence of de-
monstrable physical symptoms. · 
155. See, e.g., Ezekiel Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes 
and Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists and the Public, 347 LANCET 1805 (1996) 
(among oncology patients and the public, 70.5% and 66.5% respectively support assisted suicide 
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physiological experience, common across cultures.156 Few in our culture 
regard avoidable physical agony as good or even acceptable. It is an evil of 
great magnitude that extends beyond the physical; extreme pain totally oc-
cupies the psychic world.IS7 Thus, in a parallel discussion in recent politi-
cal philosophy, Professor Barry has suggested that avoiding physical harm 
is a good candidate for a consensus value because such harm is "deleterious 
from the point of view of a very wide range of conceptions of the 
good ..•• [O]n virtually any conception of the good, life goes better in the 
absence of physical injury.~'158 It does not devalue the physical dependency 
experienced by large segments of our population to avow that physical ag-
ony may be unbearable. 
Pain holds another attraction as a guidepost. To the extent that physi-
cal agony is an empirically definable sensation, it provides a hand-hold on 
the slippery slopes that surround assisted suicide. There is likely to be 
greater agreement on whether an individual is in agony than on whether he 
in the case of unremitting pain, 383% and 36.2% on the basis that the patient is a burden on the 
family). 
156. See, e.g., Roger C. Serlin et al., When is Cancer Pain Mild Moderate or Severe? Grad-
ing Pain Severity by Its Inteiference with Function, 61 PAIN 277 (1995) (validity of pain scales is 
reproducible across cultures within the United States and around the world); Knox H. Todd et al., 
The Effect of Ethnicity On Physician Estimates of Pain Severity in Patients with Isolated Ex-
tremity Trauma, 271 JAMA 925 {1994) (Hispanic and Anglo patients report identical assessments 
of pain for similar injuries); ERIC J. CASSElL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND TilE GoALS OF 
MEDICINE 103 (1991) (''Dedicated receptors-nociceptors--exist for painful stimuli whose neu-
ral impulses are conducted over specialized pathways in the peripheral nerves, spinal cord and 
brain • • • certain kinds of stimuli elicit the sensory response of nociception in every culture, now 
and forever."). 
157. See, e.g, ELAINE SCARRY, THEBODYINPAIN33 (1985) ("[IJn serious pain the claims of 
the body utterly nullifY the claims of the world"); id. at 54 (pain "obliterat[es] ••• the contents of 
consciousness"). 
158. BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY 87-88 {1995). See also SISSELA BOK, 
COMMON VALUES 15-16, 18-19, 30, 57 (1995) (citing duties to refrain from coercion and vio-
lence as "moral minimalism" common across cultures); STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND 
EXPERIENCE 90 (1989) {identifYing ''the great evils of human experience, reaffirmed in every 
age ••• : murder and the destruction of life, imprisonment, enslavement ••• physical pain and 
torture"); cf. MICHAEL W ALZE.R, THICK AND THIN 10 {1994) {arguing for universal applicability 
of "negative injunctions ••• against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny" that ''re-
spond to other people's pain and oppression"); SCARRY, supra note 157, at 52 {observing that 
"the most essential aspect of pain is its sheer aversiveness. While other sensations have content 
that may be positive, neutral or negative, the content of pain is itself negation."). 
Professor Bany argues further from the fact that "every society falls back on a quite limited 
range of punishments" including "physical confinement, loss of bodily parts, pain, and death. 
Unless these were regarded by people with a wide variety of conceptions of the good as evils, they 
would not function reliably as punishments." BARRY, supra, at 141. This suggests, as well that 
an examination of the definition of unacceptable cruelty for purposes of punishment is a good 
place to start the investigation of social values that are sufficiently deeply rooted to be enforced by 
the Court 
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or she is ''terminal"159 or "competent''160 or subject to ''undue influ-
ence,"161-the other bright line distinctions that have been suggested.162 To 
the extent that approved medical interventions are keyed to the elimination 
of physical agony rather than ending life, they provide an opportunity in 
most situations to test the hypothesis that the elimination of physical suf-
fering will in fact eliminate the desire for death. Efforts to lessen pain al-
low opportunities for second thoughts, and if the law permits only medical 
interventions that have the primacy intent of alleviating physical suffering, 
the scope of the population at risk is limited to those who actually experi-
ence physical agony, and whose physical condition is sufficiently compro-
mised that adequate palliative and analgesic intervention puts their health at 
risk.t63 
The focus of alleviation of physical pain carries the risk of hypocrisy, 
if physicians simply replace acquiescence in a desire for suicide with ac-
quiescence in a patient's stated desire to be "double effected to death."164 
159. On the difficulties of defining the "terminally ill," see Joanne Lynn et al., Defining the 
"Terminally Ill:" Insights from SUPPORT, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 311 (1996). 
160. Primary care physicians fail to detect 45-90% of psychiatric disorders. L. Eisenberg, 
Treating Depression and Anxiety in Primary Care-Closing the Gap between Knowledge and 
Practice, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1080, 1081 {1992). Even among psychiatrists; an Oregon study 
suggests that only 6% were very confident they can determine in a single consultation whether a 
desire for suicide is the result of mental disorders. See Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon 
Psychiatrists Toward Physician Assisted Suicide, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1631 (1994). 
161. As a way of preserving patient autonomy, the Oregon assisted suicide statute makes it a 
crime to exercise "undue influence'' in inducing an individual to choose assisted suicide. Oregon 
Ballot Measure 16, 1994, Section 4.02 (2). The vagueness ofthe standard seems self-evident. 
Of course, since pain is a subjective sensation, a person determined to commit suicide could 
continue to report pain after it has in fact ceased. · 
162. See, e.g., Eric Chevlin, The Limits of Prognostication, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 337 (1996). 
163. A right to assisted suicide rooted in rational self-determination runs the risk of a danger-
ously synergistic interaction with the tendency of physicians to underestimate the quality of life of 
those who are physically compromised. If doctors tend to view physically compromised existence 
as a low quality life more often than patient do, see e.g., Richard F. Uhlman & Robert A. 
Pearlman, Perceived Quality of Lifo and Preferences for Lifo-Sustaining Treatment in Older 
Adults, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 495 (1991); Robert A. Pearlman & Richard F. Uhlmann, 
Quality of Lifo in Chronic Disease: Perceptions of Elderly Patients 43 J. GERONTOLOGY M25, 
M27 (1988), there is a risk that doctors will regularly underestimate the degree to which suicide 
requests are the result of treatable depression. 
By contrast, the fact that physicians tend to underestimate the level of their patients' pain, 
see Todd et al., supra note 156, at 147; Quality Improvement Guidelines for the Treatment of 
Acute Pain and Cancer Pain, 274 JAMA 1874 (1995); Grossman et al., Correlation of Patient 
and Caregiver Ratings of Cancer Pain, 6 J. PAIN SYMPTOM MGT. 53 (1991), provides another bit 
of friction on the slippery slope. 
164. Standard medical ethics permit pain relief even when the medication may hasten death on 
the theory of the "principle of double effect" by which a foreseen but undesired effect may be ac-
ceptable if the intended effect of an action is itself normally permissible. See, e.g., Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Decisions Near the End of Lifo, 267 JAMA 2229, 
2231, 2233 (1992). 
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But here, as elsewhere, hypocrisy is the homage of vice to virtue. A medi-
cal regime which allows palliative risk continues to focus attention on 
avoiding pain, rather than imposing death, and at the margins, it will be less 
likely to be deformed by coerced or manipulated desires for death. For 
doctors who seek moral support in their efforts to undertake the difficult 
process of caring for dying patients and resist the temptations of dramati-
cally ending the struggle, such a regime provides better moral landmarks 
than the alternatives. 
3. Pain, The Right to Choose and the "Right to Die" 
There are thus solid bases to invoke the interest in being free from 
pain as a common value adequate to ground a right to constitutional inter-
vention. At first glance, however, this focus leaves Justices O'Connor, 
Ginsburg and Breyer in the same quandary as the majority when it comes to 
distinguishing the conceded right to abortion from the rejected right to as-
sisted suicide. Pregnancy and childbirth often do involve physical suffer-
ing.16s But laws forbidding abortion permit maternal anesthetics just as 
New York and Washington permit terminal sedation. 
It is not in the role of pain per se, but in the balance the abortion cases 
strike between the interests of women's health and the interests of the state 
in preserving fetal life that a connection can be forged. In the abortion 
cases, the state may not overcome the general right to bodily autonomy by 
asserting an interest in preserving fetal life during the first two trimesters, 
when the status of a fetus as a human being is a matter of unresolved de-
bate. In the third trimester, however, the state may intervene coercively to 
preserve a life that it is entitled to regard as a fully rights-bearing human 
being. So, too, in the case of assisted suicide, the individuals at issue are 
by all moral accounts human beings, and the state can invoke its interest in 
preserving human life at a compelling level. Indeed, in support of the sys-
tem of prohibiting assisted suicide-which is what was challenged in 
Glucksberg-the state invokes a concern that human life will be ended by 
mistake or through coercion. If the abortion cases set a legitimate balance 
between bodily autonomy and preservation of life, then the state's interest 
in avoiding mistaken or coerced death is an adequate basis for imposing 
upon the right to bodily autonomy by prohibiting assisted suicide. 
One physician of my acquaintance commented to me on the number of patients whom he has 
seen "double effected to death" with pain-killing drugs. 
165. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (plurality opinion) {"The 
mother who carries a child to full tenn is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that 
only she must bear •••• Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without 
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role •••• "). 
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But there is another level to the analysis. In the abortion cases, a dan-
ger to the health of the pregnant woman tips the balance again in favor of 
individual autonomy even in the third trimester. The state may not require 
a pregnant woman to sacrifice her health even for a viable fetus. Unremit-
ting physical agony, like the danger to a woman's health in the case of the 
third trimester abortion, seems to provide a counterweight of a magnitude 
equal to the state's claim of danger to life. A general prohibition of suicide 
sacrifices what some citizens regard as their dignity in order to preserve the 
lives of others. This choice seems at worst debatable; it can hardly be 
characterized as arbitracy.166 By contrast, a government which condemns 
some citizens to avoidable physical agony in order to preserve others 
against the risk of death is on shakier ground. The sacrifice the state de-
mands in pursuit of its ends is not so clearly justified, if it is justified at all. 
4. Rights, Pain, and the Future 
If the O'Connor/Breyer position grants constitutional stature to a right 
to avoid government-imposed pain, where might the perception lead? The 
opinions clearly contemplate potential judicial review were legislation or 
regulations to prohibit physicians from administering doses of pain medi-
cation necessary to avoid terminal suffering. But it is far from clear that 
such legislation or regulations in fact exist.167 So, too, some commentators 
maintain that a small percentage of patients suffer physical agony that can-
not be controlled by medication. If this is true-and it is not clear whether 
these estimates of 5-10% of some classes of terminal patients account for 
the possibility of ''terminal sedation" by which a patient is kept perma-
nently unconscious as a way of avoiding pain168-a suit by such a patient 
166. Cf. Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997) (striking down required drug test of 
candidates for state office as reducing "privacy for a symbol's sake"). 
167. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 164; George Annas, The 
"Right to Die" in America: Sloganeeringfrom Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 
DUQ. L. REv. 875, 895 (1996) (prescribing pain medication is not illegal; no doctor has ever been 
prosecuted); 1 ALAN MEISEL, 'nm RIGHT TO DIE 590 {2d ed. 1995) (no basis for fear of criminal 
liability); id. at 592 (no basis for fear of license revocation for provision of narcotics to patients 
suffering serious pain). 
168. Justice Breyer comments that "[m]edical technology, we are repeatedly told makes the 
administration of pain reliving drugs sufficient, except for a very few individuals for whom the 
ineffectiveness of pain control medicines can mean, not pain but the need for sedation which can 
end in a coma." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2312-13. Justice Stevens, by contrast cites authorities 
which he thinks stand for the proposition that ''palliative care ••• cannot alleviate all pain and 
suffering." !d. at 2308. 
Compare David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very Mod-
est Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REv. 443, 454 (1997) (''not all physical pain can be treated"), cited by 
Justice Stevenes, with Michael H. Levy, Drug Therapy: Pharmacologic Treatment of Cancer 
Pain, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1124, 1124 {1996) (commenting that "[n]o patient with cancer 
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who sought the means to escape pain by ending her life could also invoke 
the concurrences' concerns. Again, however, it appears that the number of 
such cases is likely to be small. 
Justice Breyer writes carefully in suggesting a right against "severe 
physical pain (connected with death)" or "(accompanying death)."169 But 
to the extent that I have adequately reconstructed the rationale for the focus 
on physical pain, it is hard to discern why the claim to avoid agonizing 
physical pain should be limited to those who are dying. Prisoners retain the 
right to avoid unnecessary infliction of pain during their lives; presumably 
civilians can invoke similar interests. At the very least, prohibitive laws 
which eliminate the possibility of avoiding pain or physical harm should be 
subject to severe constitutional scrutiny. Thus, in the looming disputes 
over needle exchanges, 170 and access to morphine as an analgesic in non-
terminal cases, 1~1 the courts need not stand aside in the face of merely ra-
tional state interests. 
More controversially, the focus on physical pain could ground a right 
of access to certain types of medical treatment. To the extent that govern-
ment intervention establishes institutional structures that bar access to 
medical treatment that can eliminate physical agony, the O'Connor/Breyer 
concurrences provide a hook for constitutional review. The claim would 
not embrace every intervention that could improve health outcomes. The 
right in question is rooted in a revulsion against torture, which comprises 
needs to live or die with unrelieved pain" because "cancer pain can be effectively treated in 85-
95% of patients •••• In the final days of life, pain not controlled ••• can be relieved by intentional 
sedation''). Cf. Nathan I. Cherney & Russell K. Portenoy, Sedation in the Management of Re-, 
fractory Symptoms: Guidelines for Evaluation and Treatment, 10 J. P ALLJATIVE CARE 31 (1994); 
Terminal Sedation in the Care of Dying Patients, ARCH INT. MED., 1785 (Sept. 9, 1996) (esti-
mates of frequency of symptoms that cannot be relieved short oftenninal sedation range from 5% 
to 52%). 
169. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2311-12. 
170. It is clear that needle exchange programs are effective in preventing the spread of AIDS 
among injection drug users. See Peter Lurie and Ernest Drucker, An Opportunity Lost: HIV In-
fictions Associated With Lack of a National Needle-Exchange Programme in the USA, 349 
LANCET 604, 605 (1997) (estimating between 4000 and 9600 cases of AIDs could have been pre-
vented by needle exchange programs, and more than 11,000 could be prevented in the next five 
years; noting that staff members in needle exchange programs have been arrested); Don C. Des 
Jarlais et al., mv Incidence Among Injecting Drug Users in New Your City Syringe-Exchange 
Programmes, 348 LANCET 987 (1995) (reviewing the efficacy of needle-exchange programs in 
preventing the spread of AIDS). But federal and local prohibitions on the distribution of sterile 
drug injection materials make these programs illegal in some areas, and infeasible in others. See 
Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Prevention of mv AIDS and other Blood Borne Diseases Among In-
jection Drug Users: A National Survey on the Regulation of Syringes and Needles, 277 JAMA 
53 (1997); cf. Commonwealth v. Lena, 616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993); State v. Sorge, 591 A.2d 
1382 (NJ. Super. 1991); People v. Bordowilz, 588 N.Y.S.2d 507 {1991). See also Katharine Q. 
Seelye, AMA Calls for Needle Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A15. ' 
171. See, e.g., Hill, When Will Adequate Pain Treatment Be the Nonn?, 274 JAMA 1881 
(1995); Diane Gianelli, Controlling Chronic Pain, 40 AM. MED. NEWS 1, Mar. 17, 1997. 
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the government imposing current physical agony on real individuals. But a 
government-mandated HMO that systematically denies medically indicated 
emergency room care, like a health official who denies the latest generation 
of protease inhibitors to homeless individuals, or a system that rations other 
life-saving care parsimoniously would seem prima facie to violate the same 
principle that inhibits the government from "preventing ... the administra-
tion of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end oflife."m 
The claim is not without potential doctrinal obstacles. Justice Breyer 
exonerates the government from responsibility for the "institutional reasons 
or inadequacies or obstacles" which currently inhibit the delivery of pallia-
tive treatment; he would entertain a claim only "were state law to prevent 
the provision of palliative care," which "forces a dying person to undergo 
[severe] pain."173 The determinative issue will be what quantum of state 
involvement is adequate to trigger constitutional concern. In Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, only "deliberate indifference" to serious medi-
cal needs is proscribed; in the parallel issue of safety in custodial facilities, 
a choice informed by medical judgment is enough to meet the standards of 
due process, 174 and there is always the possibility that the state may dis-
claim responsibility for the actions of the agents to whom it has left crucial 
choices.175 But as the government moves to an increasingly extensive in-
volvement in and regulation of medical care, the Glucksberg concurrences 
provide hope of a constitutional minimum of decency in the administration 
of that system. 
VI. Conclusion: The Supreme Court as Teacher 
In an increasingly diverse society, the risk grows that we will lose our 
power to actually engage one another on moral issues. The Supreme Court 
172. Cf. David Bans berg, MPH, M.D., et al., Protease Inhibitors in the Homeless, 278 JAMA 
63 (1997). A court seeking to avoid entanglement in the area could still claim that the constitu-
tional inhibition extends only to "unnecessary'' imposition of physical pain. See Glucksberg, 117 
S. Ct at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). But in the prison context, the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 106 
(1976). 
173. 117 S.Ct at2312. 
174. See Youngbergv. Romero, 457 U.S. 307,319 (1982). 
175. Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); 
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (deci-
sions by nursing homes receiving Medicaid funds were not state action); with, e.g., Catanzano v. 
Dowling, 60 F.3d 113 {2d Cir. 1995) (decisions by certified home health agencies denying serv-
ices are state action requiring due process); Grijalva v.Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996) 
(Medicare HMO decision denying services is state action requiring due process). A great deal is 
likely to tum on the degree to which the government is directly and intentionally responsible for 
the structure in question, and the degree to which it has preempted other structures of care. 
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can sometimes counteract these dangers by providing a locus of common 
moral deliberation. When it takes this role, it can, on occasion, furnish a 
common vocabulary to discuss and resolve contentious issues. But, as 
many commentators have noted, in 1he process of resolving cases authori-
tatively, the Court risks excluding legitimate moral viewpoints from subse-
quent public discussion. This has been one critique of the Court's decision 
in Roe v. Wade.116 · 
In this dimension, the Glucksberg decision avoids this arguable failing 
of Roe; each of the opinions takes seriously the claims of tragic deprivation 
advanced by the opposing camps before the Court. The opinions that ex-
plicitly leave open the possibility of future judicial intervention fully ac-
knowledge the good faith of the proponents of prohibition. And Justice 
Rehnquist's majority opinion, unlike some of the prior cases in which the 
court has deferred to the political process by dismissing claims of constitu-
tional protection as "facetious,"177 accepts and embraces a role for the 
Court in guarding the bodily integrity ofthe citizenry. The majority sounds 
sincere when it acknowledges an "earnest and profound debate about the 
morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide."178 
Each of the opinions emphasizes the ongoing discussion in which so-
ciety is engaged.179 When all of the opinions are taken together, the Court 
frames and advances that debate rather than ending it. By highlighting 
rather than belittling the tragic dimensions of assisted suicide, the Court has 
thus laid the groundwork for continued moral conversation. 
176. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, !DEALS, BELIEFS, ATIITUDES AND Tim LAW 98·110 
{1985}; ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLIC! 344-351, 357-62 {1992); MARY ANN 
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCEINWEST.ERNLAW 45-50 {1987). 
177. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 186, 194 (1986). 
178. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2275. 
179. See id. (Rehnquist, CJ.) ("Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound de-
bate •••• "); id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (''Every one of us at some point may be af-
fected ••• [t]here is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper bal-
ance •••• "); id. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring) (Court should "stay its hand to allow reasonable 
legislative consideration"). 

